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REGULATION IN THE FACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCE: WHO MAKES THESE CALLS ANYWAY?.
REv. JOHN H. PEARSON, C.S.C.*
It has become a commonplace to note how fast changes in
science and technology are intruding into the way we ordinary
human beings live our lives. It is unusual to open a newspaper or
to turn on the television news without being hit with some new
story about how fast the world is changing around us. How fast is
electronic commerce growing? Just how close are they to cloning
a human being; after all, we already have cloned sheep and cattle
and who knows what other animals sharing our world with us?
It has also become a commonplace to note that these dizzy-
ing changes in science and technology can easily outstrip those
systems by which we humans make critical decisions about what
can and should be done by those who are responsible members
of society and about how to protect those responsible members
of society from those who are not so responsible.
Two of the areas of science and technology in which we see
some of the fastest and perhaps most far-reaching changes are in
biotechnology-for example genetic engineering and cloning-
and in computer technology-especially the Internet and the
dramatic challenges it poses to many different areas of law, from
tort and contract to trademark and copyright. It is these two
areas upon which the editors of this journal have chosen to focus
their attention in this issue, as examples of and proxies for the
many types of changes that are challenging the legal and moral
systems of modem society. In both cases, those of biotechnology
and of rapidly burgeoning computer and Internet technology,
advances are so fast and furious that they raise severe doubts
about how and if the legal and governmental structures of west-
ern democracy, or indeed of any form of modern government,
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can respond so that the response is not obsolete, outmoded, use-
less, and even counterproductive by the time it becomes
established.
Should judges respond to these situations, should legisla-
tures, or should anybody at all? One of the things sometimes said
about the common law is that it has amazing flexibility in its abil-
ity to deal with changing circumstances. When people show up
in a common-law court with disputes over an area of law in which
there is no precedent, judges might form an answer by analogiz-
ing to law in entirely different areas. So, to quote a classical
example dear to the heart of us property professors, if judges
were faced with decisions about ownership of oil and natural gas
resources, they might analogize from the law of wild animals to
determine rights in these "fugitive" resources.1 On the other
hand, some will say that the common law is also particularly con-
servative and precedent-bound in its approaches to most situa-
tions and therefore not well-suited for dealing with this type of
change. And when analogy comes into play, it does not really
render a solution well-suited to the problem it attempts to solve.
Given the rapidity with which biotechnology and computer tech-
nology are changing, how could one ever seriously argue that the
common law could provide a regulatory regime responsive
enough to these very modern problems?
So what about statutes? People can form equally telling criti-
cisms: it takes too long for issues to make it to the radar screen of
legislatures; legislatures are too beholden to lobbyists to make
decisions based on the merits; legislatures are too responsive (or
not responsive enough) to pressures from their constituencies;
legislatures devise schemes that are too detailed and rigid, or the
opposite, leaving too much discretion in the hands of that target
of so much, often uninformed, criticism-the bureaucrat.
1. Judges came up with a rather ingenious analogy to wild-animal law, as
expressed in cases like Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805)
(involving a dispute over a fleeing fox and granting ownership to the one who
actually brought the fox into possession by killing it), to decide how ownership
of oil and gas rights should be distributed. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Central Ky.
Nat. Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934), overruled by Texas Am. Energy Corp. v.
Citizens Fidelity Bank & Tr. Co., 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987). "[A]nalogies to the
capture of wild animals show up time and again when courts have to deal on a
nonstatutory basis with some 'fugitive' resource that is being reduced to
property for the first time ... " Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property,
52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 75 (1985). That these solutions by analogy have their
weaknesses is symbolized by the Kentucky Supreme Court's action in overruling
Hammonds and that in this particular area most states now have statutory
regimes.
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Perhaps the situation is such that we ought simply to sit back
and wait a while. Maybe in areas as fluid as these any attempt at
regulation is doomed to fail. Maybe we ought to let the "market"
rule and shake out various forms of behavior, and once the out-
lines of behavior finally begin to settle down, then it will be possi-
ble to figure out who is being helped and who is being harmed.
And once we can figure that out we can fashion some reasonable
approach to governing so that each person is not simply at the
mercy of whoever is stronger and more ruthless. Or, if we do
that, will we have waited too long with the result that behavior
destructive to human life and the human spirit will have become
entrenched in our way of thinking?
I. WHAT ABOUT DOLLY, AND THOSE HUMANS TO SUCCEED HER?
The pace of change in the biological and medical sciences is
dizzying. It is unusual to pick up a copy of a newspaper or maga-
zine without running into a headline about new breakthroughs
that will surely change the way we live or our conception of who
we are. "How to Build a Body Part" is the headline with which
Time magazine trumpets scientific breakthroughs in the use of
human stem cells, the most immature in the embryonic body,
which scientists are trying to figure how to give 'Just the right
kick in just the right direction [so that] each could become a
liver, a heart, a brain or a bone."2 Time devoted a special issue to
"The Future of Medicine,"3 with articles on genetic testing, DNA
mapping, "designer babies," repairing DNA, and so forth. Fur-
ther, in "Cows and Clones on a Va. Pharm,"4 the Washington Post
informs us of a farm in Blacksburg, Virginia where the same com-
pany that in Scotland assisted in cloning Dolly the sheep gives us
Rosie, a cow whose milk, through genetic manipulation, carries a
human protein that may be useful in making drugs. That same
company also helped to develop pigs with genetic modifications
that make their organs "a bit more like those of human beings"
so that someday those organs may be suitable for transplantation
into humans, thereby solving the shortage of transplantable
organs.5 Finally the company gives us Mr. Jefferson, a Holstein
bull whose claim to fame is that he is a clone.6 The last is per-
haps most interesting. Cloning is a topic that strikes a chord that
2. John Fischman, How to Build a Body Part, TIME, Mar. 1, 1999, at 54, 54.
3. TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 42-91 (Special Issue: The Future of Medicine).
4. Justin Gillis, Cows and Clones on a Va. Pharm: Where Animals Make Drugs
and Gene Research Goes to the Frontier, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al.
5. Id.
6. See id.
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reverberates through our imaginations. It serves as a useful
proxy for the many kinds of advances in medicine and the bio-
logical sciences and for various kinds of genetic engineering that
the public hears so much about these days. By one measure it is
just one other of various technologies by which plant, animal,
and now human genetic road maps are being redrawn, but it
draws so much fascinated attention by the public because it
seems to be such a radical step into a future that is at once prom-
ising and terrifying. It implicates issues of our very nature as
humans, of playing God, of stepping too far and too fast into the
unknown. Cloning is just the kind of subject that people see as
requiring careful, thoughtful, and some of us would even say,
prayerful consideration. However:
While ethicists have been debating human cloning, while
legislators have been considering bans and while pastors
have been inveighing against tampering with God's crea-
tion, PPL scientists have been quietly plugging away in
barns and pastures here, trying to sidestep the controversy.
They see cloning as a quick, efficient way to produce ani-
mals with special genetic traits that can solve health
problems, and as a potentially profitable business.
7
This quotation leads into John H. Robinson's essay, "Why an
Acceptable Cloning Policy Will Be Hard to Achieve,"8 in which
he outlines the great difficulties to be faced in achieving rational
cloning policy because it would have to grow out of "four differ-
ent sorts of inputs: scientific, political, religious, and financial."'
He further notes the difficulty in achieving any kind of effective
regulation, even if the previous questions are answered, given
both the availability of finances to do the research and the free
flow of knowledge across national and any other kind of artificial
boundaries. 10
On the same topic of cloning, M. Cathleen Kaveny provides
a very readable and understandable cut at some of the ethical
and legal issues arising from the cloning of human beings in
"Cloning and Positive Liberty."1 1 She identifies "at least eight
persons"" involved in the creation of a human clone and raises
7. Id. PPL is the company that assisted in the cloning of Dolly and runs
the farm referred to in the text accompanying footnotes 4-6. See id.
8. John H. Robinson, Why an Acceptable Cloning Policy Will Be Hard to
Achieve, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9 (1999).
9. Id. at 9.
10. See id. at 12-14.
11. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Cloning and Positive Liberty, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 15 (1999).
12. Id. at 22.
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issues concerning not only the person who would be cloned, but
most especially concerning the welfare of the person who would
be the product of cloning. In "Cloning and Harming: Children,
Future Persons, and the 'Best Interest' Test,"' 3 M.A. Roberts also
examines human cloning and argues that courts should adopt a
"clear and convincing" standard of proof that "using a child or
undifferentiated embryo as clone source is ... in the best interest
of the child or the future person" before allowing cloning tech-
nologies to be used to produce new people.' 4
In asking "What Sort of People Do We Want,"15 Michael J.
Reiss raises some of the ethical concerns arising out of genetic
engineering, specifically somatic gene therapy and germ-line
therapy, the first of which he argues is "ethically fairly
unproblematic,' and the latter of which is presently too unsafe
to be ethically permissible, though that may not always be so.' 7
He concludes that "for the foreseeable future it is probably best
to outlaw the use of either somatic or germ-line modification to
enhance human traits."18
George P. Smith, II, in "Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age
of Biotechnology," 9 addresses some complex questions of regu-
lation in wider areas of biotechnology and looks to courts rather
than legislatures as the best institutions to deal with them. He
states that the "major concern is for the courts to remain forever
vigilant to the interlinking relationships or synergistic forces
found in law, science, ethics, and medicine,"20 and calls for a
"modified form ofjudicial activism " 21 so that science is not left to
direct the future of this new age and "law to remain a reactive
force."
22
13. M.A. Roberts, Cloning and Harming: Children, Future Persons, and the
"Best Interest" Test, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1999).
14. Id. at 53.
15. MichaelJ. Reiss, What Sort of People Do We Want? The Ethics of Changing
People Through Genetic Engineering, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 63
(1999).
16. Id. at 63.
17. See id. at 80.
18. Id. at 92.
19. George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of Biotechnology,
13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 93 (1999).
20. Id. at 93.
21. Id. at 94.
22. Id.
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II. COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET:
BORN FREE OR BORN TO BE REGULATED?
Perhaps the mere difficulty of devising an appropriate
scheme to regulate the fast-growing and changing Internet sug-
gests the soundness of a laissez-faire approach. Shouldn't the
effort be abandoned? Hasn't the unregulated growth itself of the
Internet and of other computer technologies led to amazing pro-
gress and created enormous wealth that will benefit far more
people than it might harm? Wouldn't regulation serve to slow
down that growth and perhaps distort it? In dealing with elec-
tronic commerce, for example, Congress itself has mandated that
regulation should be approached cautiously, waiting until situa-
tions clarify themselves. Maybe that is the way to deal with the
whole rapidly evolving computer and Internet world; maybe one
ought to go even further and for. the foreseeable future leave the
world of the Internet a virtual place where all kinds of growth
can take place. Several years ago I attended a conference during
which a panel of speakers was trying to make the point that the
Internet as a set of technologies and behaviors took its primary
value from the fact that indeed it was not regulated. There were
visions of hardy pioneers making their way in a frontier in which
there was no bothersome government to interfere with their
rapid growth. So, if some soul were to be slandered on a World
Wide Web site, that was a small price to be paid for all the value
that could be derived from this free and unfettered growth. That
outmoded laws of libel and slander applied to this "community"
could do nothing but harm was the message I took with me. It
would be fair to say, I think, that not too many take that position
seriously. Most people would consider the mere fact that there
exists a technology now that may do harm much more efficiently
(as, indeed, it may do good much more efficiently) itself to be a
more urgent reason for regulation.
But even if that be so, that most people grant the need for
some regulation of the Internet, the difficulty of developing a
scheme of regulation still remains. And even if those are correct
who say that it would be foolhardy and perhaps destructive to try
to devise such a scheme so early in the development of this brave
new world, ought one not still explore various ideas, trying them
out in smaller venues to see how they affect life in this electronic
universe? The nature of the Internet is that a person may unleash
a piece of information and virtually instantaneously it will have
crossed national boundaries and been seen in far corners of the
world. If someone has been libeled or slandered by a statement
made in an Internet posting, a series of obvious questions arises:
1999] REGULATION IN THE FACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE 7
(1) By whose standard is the statement libelous or slanderous?
That of the place where the statement was made, that of the
place where the statement was received, or that of the place
where the person resides who was the subject of the statement?
What is actionable in New York may not be actionable in York;
what is actionable in New Mexico may not be actionable in Mex-
ico. (2) If one determines that the event is actionable, in what
venue will it be tried? Where the statement was posted? The res-
idence of the person claiming harm? (3) Whose law will apply?
By no means always the same place where a trial would be held.
(4) What redress will be available? Damages may be available in
London, Ontario that are not available in London, England.
Or if the question is about electronic commerce, whose law
determines what is fraud? Can an "innocent" business person
end up responsible to the laws of a country much stricter than
the laws of her own country because she does business over the
Internet? Or the converse, can the "innocent" consumer end up
without redress for fraud because of the differing laws of the
country in which an Internet offer was posted?
Or what about questions of privacy? Vast amounts of infor-
mation about persons are now being collected routinely, from
supermarket cards in the checkout line to technology that tracks
the Web travels of those who visit certain Web sites, from medical
information collected by insurance companies to law enforce-
ment agencies. By what law and by whose law will the collection
of such information by regulated? What power will reside in the
hands of whoever can gather that information into one place?
It is difficult to imagine an end to the variety of questions
raised by the existence of electronic and computer technology
and the ability to so easily and quickly transmit information. But
one must try to identify those issues and explore possible solu-
tions. We offer you here three different cuts at that task. First,
Karin Mika raises and proposes answers to some issues created by
cellular telephones and electronic mail that particularly affect
the practicing lawyer and his or her duties of confidentiality to
the client in "Of Cell Phones and Electronic Mail."2 Next, in
"To the Millennium: Emerging Issues for the Year 2000 and
Cyberspace,"24 Carl W. Chamberlin lays out in significant detail a
number of the serious legal issues raised by the Y2K problem and
23. Karin Mika, Of Cell Phones and Electronic Mail: Disclosure of Confidential
Information Under Disciplinary Rule 4-101 and Model Rule 1.6, 13 NOTr DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 121 (1999).
24. Carl W. Chamberlin, To the Millennium: Emerging Issues for the Year
2000 and Cyberspace, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 131 (1999).
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the Internet, issues that stretch notions of the law with which we
are familiar. Finally, a student piece by Charles R. Topping,
"The Surf Is Up, but Who Owns the Beach-Who Should Regu-
late Commerce on the Internet?,"2 5 uses a federal district court
case to explore questions about what basic form regulation of the
Internet ought to take. Is the highway the best analogy from
which to derive principles of regulation, or is it something else
entirely?
III. CONTROL OR BE CONTROLLED
These areas of biotechnology and computer technology are
certainly not the only ones in our society in which change comes
rapidly. With the growth of the ability to gather and manipulate
rapidly ever-increasing amounts of information in many different
areas of thought, there will be many new challenges to the ability
of the human mind and spirit to understand what is happening,
much less to evaluate what direction development ought to go.
But evaluate, ponder, decide; these are what we must learn to do,
if we are not to be controlled by the technologies we develop.
The articles in this issue of the Journal we hope present some
useful contributions to that process.
25. Charles R. Topping, The Surf Is Up, but Who Owns the Beach?-Who
Should Regulate Commerce on the Internet?, 13 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 179 (1999).
